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Case No. 20050279-SC 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
Jeffery Don Ireland, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from its decision in State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22,106 P.3d 753. The Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the term "consumption," as described by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
2(l)(dd) (West 2004), include the metabolization of a controlled substance in the 
human body? 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (dd) (West 2004) violate the Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution by subjecting "status criminals'' to prosecu-
tion? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court "review[s] the decision 
of the court of appeals and not that of the district court/' State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 
11, 103 P.3d 699. The Court reviews that decision "for correctness, ceding no 
deference to the court of appeals." Id. In doing so, the Court "must determine 
whether the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review when consider-
ing the district court's ruling." State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 7,112 P.3d 507. 
The question of whether "consumption," as described in Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-2(1) (dd) (West 2004), includes the metabolization of a controlled substance in the 
human body, is a matter of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute is 
a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 5,31 P.3d 
528. 
"A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law, as does an 
issue of constitutional interpretation." State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, If 4,100 P.3d 1218. 
This Court reviews both for correctness. Id. 
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RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (dd) (1998) 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, con-
trol, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the ap-
plication, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distin-
guished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes indi-
vidual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (i) (Supp. 1999) 
(2) Prohibited acts B --Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use 
a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid pre-
scription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this chapter[.] 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-201 (1999) 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense 
which he commits, while either within or outside the state, by his 
own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, 
if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the 
state; 
* * * 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the con-
duct which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such an 
element, occurs within this state. 
* * * 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Based on a positive blood test for methamphetamine and marijuana, defendant 
was charged with unlawful possession or use of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony, and driving with measurable marijuana in the body, a class B misdemeanor. 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, Tf 3; R. 1-3. The State moved for a pretrial ruling on 
jurisdiction, arguing that the presence of methamphetamine in defendant's blood-
stream established his continued "consumption" of the drug within the State. 83-87. 
The trial court agreed, concluding that "'consumption' includes defendant's 
physiological metabolism of the substance, which was an ongoing process." Ireland, 
2005 UT App 22, % 4; R. 206-08. 
Defendant thereafter pled guilty to both counts as charged, but reserved the right 
to appeal the trial court's decision finding jurisdiction. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, ^ f 4; 
R. 169-76. The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years 
for unlawful possession of methamphetamine and a concurrent jail term of 180 days 
for driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body. R. 191-96. 
Defendant appealed and the court of appeals reversed. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, 
If 1;R. 209,226-28,245-47. 
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Summary of Facts 
On November 3, 2001, while driving a pick-up truck, defendant hit another 
vehicle, resulting in the death of Angel Garcia, the driver of the other car. Ireland, 
2005 UT App 22, \ 2; R. 248:6-7; Exh. 1. When West Valley Police Officer Buchanan 
responded to the hospital to contact defendant, he noticed that defendant exhibited 
symptoms of being under the influence of an analgesic narcotic: his pupils were 
constricted; his eyelids were droopy; his movements were slow and clumsy; he had 
muscle tremors in his legs; he swayed from side to side; his mouth was dry; and his 
speech was slow and raspy. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, ^  2; Exh. 1. 
Officer Buchanan requested permission to draw a blood sample, but defendant 
refused. R. 248:43-44. Police thereafter secured a search warrant to test defendant's 
blood, and, more than five hours after the accident, obtained a blood sample from 
defendant. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, \ 2; R. 248:24,54. Defendant also volunteered 
a urine sample at the jail. R. 248: 25-26. Testing of the blood revealed a metham-
phetamine level of .10 micrograms per milliliter and a marijuana metabolite level of 
6 nanograms per milliliter. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, \ 2; R. 248: 51; Exh. 3. The 
urinalysis confirmed the presence of both amphetamine and cannabis metabolites. 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, \ 2; R. 248: 51-52; Exh. 3.1 
1
 The court of appeals incorrectly stated that no narcotics were found in de-
fendant's urine sample, Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, f 2. The toxicology report indi-
cated that "[t]he urine screened positive for amphetamines" and detected marijuana 
metabolite "at a level above 250 nanograms per milliliter." Exh. 3. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The use of a controlled substance is defined as "the application, inhalation, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of 
controlled substances...." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999)." Appli-
cation/7 "inhalation/7 "swallowing/7 and "injection77 describe all of the possible 
methods by which a controlled substance may be introduced into the body. 
"Consumption77 therefore describes something more. "Consumption/7 as commonly 
understood, means the act of using up something or the act of destroying a thing by 
using it or using a thing in a way that thereby exhausts it. Consumption, therefore, 
is an ongoing process. This definition is reasonably read to include the body's 
ongoing consumption or metabolization of a drug in the body. Statutes and cases 
cited by the court of appeals limiting the definition of consumption are inapposite. 
Defining consumption as including the metabolization of drugs in the body does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment by subjecting "status77 criminals to prosecution. 
While addicts will undoubtedly be convicted for using drugs, they are subject to 
prosecution only for their current use of a drug. So long as the drug is present in the 
blood, the addict is consuming the drug and is subject to the drug's effects. Prosecu-
tion for using drugs does not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court ruled that "'consumption7 includes [the] physiological metabolism 
of [a] substance, which [is] an ongoing process," and that defendant was thus 
subject to prosecution in Utah. R. 207. The court of appeals reversed, holding that 
"consumption" does not include the metabolism of a substance in the body, but is "a 
catchall term to encompass novel methods of introducing a substance into the 
body." Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, \ 19. The court of appeals also concluded that "a 
contrary holding would subject 'status criminals/ such as drug addicts, to continu-
ous guilt for possession or use of a controlled substance" in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. Id. at \ 20. The holdings are incorrect. 
I. "Consumption" includes the metabolization of a controlled sub-
stance in the body. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act prohibits both the -possession of a controlled 
substance and the use of a controlled substance. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1999) (making it unlawful to "knowingly and intentionally... possess or use 
a controlled substance"). The Act defines "'[possession or use'" as "the joint or 
individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintain-
ing, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as 
distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, 
joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances " Utah Code Ann. § 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
58-37-2(1)(dd) (Supp. 1999). This definition may thus be divided into two parts—one 
defining "possession" and the other "use": 
"Possession" . . . means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, [or] maintaining... of con-
trolled substances.... 
"[U]se" means. . . the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, 
or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of controlled sub-
stances . . . . 
Id. The question before the Court here focuses solely on the meaning of "consump-
tion" as it is used to define "use." 
* * * 
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^  25,4 P.3d 795. The Court 
reads the statutory language so as "'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and 
meaningful.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, If 52,63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v. Tooele 
County, 2002 UT 8, If 10,44 P.2d 680) (emphasis and brackets in original). Accord-
ingly, '"effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a 
statute. . . . No clause[,] sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or 
insignificant if the construction can be found which will give force to and preserve 
all the words of the statute.'" Id. at | 53 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland-
Statutory Construction § 46:06 (4th ed. 1984). 
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In interpreting a statute, the Court "do[es] not look to language in isolation," but 
"look[s] first to the statute's plain language, in relation to the statute as a whole, to 
determine its meaning.'" Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, \ 
18,96 P.3d 916. Accordingly, to determine the meaning of "consumption," the Court 
must also determine the meaning of the other terms that define "use," i.e., "applica-
tion," "inhalation," "swallowing," and "injection." 
"Application" is the act of "plac[ing] in contact," as in "apply[ing] an antiseptic 
to a cut," Webster's Third New IntT Dictionary 105 (1993), or as in a "suppository 
application," Charles L. Eberle, "On the Use of Wax, Tallow, Etc., in Suppositories," 
American Journal of Pharmacy, Vol. XLIII, 1871. "Inhalation" is the act of "draw[ing] 
in by breathing," Webster's at 1163, as in smoking, sniffing, or snorting. "Swallow-
ing" is the act of "tak[ing] in through the mouth as food," Webster's at 717, or drink. 
And "injection" is "the act . . . of injecting a drug or other substance into the body." 
Webster's at 1164. 
The court of appeals reasoned that because the foregoing terms each describe a 
method by which a controlled substance may be introduced into the body, "con-
sumption" should likewise be limited to a method by which a controlled substance 
is introduced into the body. See Ireland, 2005 UT App 22,119. The court concluded 
that it is "a catchall term to encompass novel methods of introducing a substance 
into the body." Id. That conclusion, however, is not supported by reason, nor is it 
supported by the plain meaning of "consumption." 
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To introduce a drug into one's body, a person must either apply it, inhale it, 
swallow it, or inject it. Unless one can "wish" or "will" a substance into the body, 
there are no other ways, and will be no other ways, to introduce drugs into the 
body. The court of appeals's suggestion that "consumption" is a catchall term is 
thus illusory and not supported by reason. 
Moreover, the plain language of the statute does not suggest that "consumption" 
is a catchall term. As the statute reads now, "use" means "the application, inhala-
tion, swallowing, injection, or consumption... of controlled substances." Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (dd). Had the legislature intended "consumption" to be a catchall 
term for introducing drugs into the body, it would have defined "use" as "the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or other consumption... of controlled 
substances." But it did not. And as such, the Legislature must have intended a 
meaning distinct from the other terms defining use. See Maestas, 2002 UT123, ^  52 
(holding that effect must be given to every word of a statute). 
Webster's defines "consumption" as "the act or action of consuming or destroy-
ing" or the "using up . . . of something." Webster's at 490. "Consume" means "to use 
up; expend" or "to waste or burn away." Id. As noted by the court of appeals, 
"Black's Law Dictionary defines 'consumption' as '[t]he act of destroying a thing by 
using it; the use of a thing in a way that thereby exhausts it.'" Ireland, 2005 UT App 
22, f 10 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 312 (7th ed. 1999) (emphases added). 
Therefore, by its ordinary and common definition, "consumption" is much more 
10 
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than the act of introducing a substance into the body. It is the action or process of 
"using up" the substance or "burn[ing] away" the substance until it is exhausted. 
For example, gasoline is not immediately consumed when it is introduced into the 
gas tank at the fuel pump, but is progressively consumed as the vehicle "uses" or 
"expends" the fuel. Likewise, methamphetamine is not immediately consumed 
upon injection or inhalation, but is progressively consumed as it is metabolized in 
the body. So long as the drug is in the bloodstream, the drug is not destroyed or 
exhausted, and the consumption continues. 
Under its common definition, "consumption" thus reasonably includes the 
metabolism of a controlled substance in the body. See Merriam-Webster Med. Diet., 
at www2.merriamwebster.com/ cgibin/ mwmednlm?book=Medi-cal&va=meta-
bolism (defining metabolism as "the processes by which a particular substance is 
handled (as by assimilation and incorporation or by detoxification and excretion) in 
the living body"). In fact, "consumption" is frequently used in this very way. See, 
e.g., J.D. Maltzman, Developments in the Fight Against Cancer Cachexia, Abramson 
Cancer Center of the U. of Pennsylvania, at http:/ / www.oncolink.org/resources/ 
article.cfm?c=3&s=38&ss=164&id.=828 (stating that "[o]ften, the body's consump-
tion of energy is also increased," or, "[i]n other words, the body's metabolic rate, 
even at rest, is significantly higher"); Health Matters Library A-Z, at ht tp: / / 
www.abc.net.au/health/regions/library/ ff_diabetes.htm (stating that "[p]hysical 
activity increases the body's consumption of glucose from the blood"); Burn Rate 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Testing Centers, at http://burnratediet.com/centers/ about.cfm (stating that [a] 
quicker way to determine your metabolic, or burn, rate, is to take a simple test 
which measures your body's consumption of energy either at rest or while exercis-
ing")-
"Consumption" should be given this broader meaning. Only by doing so will 
"'all parts [of the statute be] relevant and meaningful.'" Maestas, 2002 UT 123, % 52 
(citation omitted). The court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. 
* * * 
The court of appeals cited State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988), in 
support of its conclusion that "consumption" does not include the ongoing con-
sumption of a drug in the body. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, ^ f 14. That case, however, 
is inapposite. In dicta, the court of appeals agreed with those cases from other 
jurisdictions which held that the presence of alcohol on the breath or in the blood-
stream does not constitute "possession." Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 468 & n.2. But as 
explained above, consumption is a form of "use" not "possession." Accordingly, 
Sorenson offers no support for the court's holding. 
In Sorenson, the State did concede that "it could not prove that the offense of 
consumption was committed in Utah" by virtue of an odor of alcohol on the 
defendant's breath. Id. at 469. However, the State treated consumption as being 
limited to the introduction of alcohol into the body by drinking and did not seek a 
12 
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broader definition. As a result, the issue before the Court in this case was not at 
issue in Sorenson. The State does not make a similar concession here. The case, 
therefore, offers no support for the court of appeals holding. Sorenson is also 
distinguishable in that no blood or breath test was performed to establish that 
alcohol was in fact in defendant's body and that he was thus still "consuming" it. 
The court of appeals7 s reliance on statutes and case law from other jurisdictions 
is also misplaced. 
In support of its holding that "consumption" is limited to the introduction of a 
controlled substance into the body, the court of appeals cited statutes from Michi-
gan, Texas, and Oregon. These laws, however, offer no support for the court's 
holding because their language is not similar to Utah's statute. 
Michigan expressly limits "consumption" to the act of introducing a substance 
into the body: 
"Consumed" means to have eaten, drunk, ingested, inhaled, in-
jected, or topically applied, or to have performed any combination of 
those actions, or otherwise introduced into the body. 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.37(3)(b) (2004). Texas likewise limits the definition of 
consumption: 
"Human consumption" means the injection, inhalation, ingestion, 
or application of a substance to or into a human body. 
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(21) (2004). So too does Oregon in its 
definition of ingest: 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Ingest" means to consume or otherwise deliver a controlled sub-
stance into the body of a person, except that "ingest" does not include 
inhalation of marijuana smoke. 
Or.Rev.Stat. § 475.984(3)(c) (2003). 
By their express terms, the laws in Michigan and Texas limit the definition of 
consumption to ingesting (eating and drinking), inhaling, injecting, or applying a 
controlled substance. Utah law, on the other hand, does not limit "consumption" by 
so defining it. To the contrary, it adds it to the list of ways in which a drug can be 
"used." As explained, its addition to this list of uses suggests that, unlike the 
Michigan and Texas laws, "consumption" is more than the application; inhalation, 
swallowing, or injection of a controlled substance.2 
Like the Michigan and Texas laws, the Oregon statute limits the definition of 
consumption. It does so by stating that "'[i]ngest' means to consume or otherwise 
deliver a controlled substance into the body of a person." Id. (emphasis added). 
Use of the word "otherwise" signifies that "consume" is in a class of methods for 
"delivering] a controlled substance into the body of a person." Id. In contrast, and 
as explained above, supra, at 10, the Utah statute does not use "other" or "other-
wise" to limit the reach of "consumption" to the class of uses previously identified. 
2
 Moreover, in its last session, the Utah Legislature specifically defined "con-
sumption" under the Utah Controlled Substances Act as "ingesting or having any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body, but . . . not 
include[ing] the metabolite of a controlled substance." 2005 Utah Laws c. 283. 
14 
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The court of appeals also cites decisions from Kansas and Washington in support 
of its holding that "consumption" is limited to the introduction of a controlled 
substance into the body. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, \ \ 15-17. These cases, however, 
offer no support for the court's holding because they address laws that by their 
express terms are less expansive than Utah's statute. 
In State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208,211 (Kan. 1993), the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that "[o]nce a controlled substance is within a person's system, the power to 
control, possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end." The Kansas court 
explained that "[t]he ability to control the drug is beyond human capabilities," and 
therefore, "[t]he essential element of control is absent." Id. (emphases added). The 
court thus concluded that" [e]vidence of a controlled substance after it is assimilated 
in a person's blood does not establish possession or control of that substance." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Flinchpaugh is not helpful because unlike Utah's statute, the Kansas statute does 
not prohibit the "use" of a controlled substance. The Kansas statute in question 
makes it unlawful "'to manufacture, possess, have under [ ] control, possess with 
intent to sell, sell, prescribe, administer, deliver, distribute, dispense or compound'" 
controlled substances. Id. (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65~4127a). The statute thus 
focuses on the unlawful "possession" of drugs, an essential element of which is 
control. 
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In State v. Hornaday, 713 R2d 71 (Wash. 1986), the Washington Supreme Court 
relies on Flinchpaugh in likewise concluding that a person could not be in "posses-
sion" of any liquor once the person has drank the beverage. The court explained 
that once a person drinks the alcohol, it is "no longer in [the person's] control 
and/or possession." Hornaday, 713 P.2d at 75 (citing Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 208). 
As explained, however, the issue here is not whether defendant possessed the 
methamphetamine, but whether he was using the methamphetamine. 
Like Utah's statute, the Washington statute also makes it unlawful to "consume" 
the prohibited substance. Id. at 73 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270). But 
unlike Utah's statute, the Washington statute provides a definition of "consume" 
that specifically limits its meaning to the initial act of consumption, defining it as 
"'the putting of liquor to any use, whether by drinking or otherwise.'" Id. at 76 
(quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 66.04.010(6)) (emphasis added). Use of the verb "put" 
denotes the initiation of drinking. See Webster's Int'l at 1849 (defining "put" as "to 
cause to perform an action" or "to set to use"). Utah's statute has not limited the 
meaning of "consumption" by so defining it.3 
The court of appeals also criticized an outcome where consumption is de-
fined one way under the alcohol laws and another way under the drug Laws. Ireland, 
2005 UT App 22, \ 18. But as noted above, supra, at 12-13, Utah appellate courts 
have not directly addressed whether the "consumption" of alcohol includes the 
metabolism of alcohol. In any event, a difference in definition is reasonable where 
controlled substances are contraband (absent a prescription), but alcohol is not. 
16 
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II. Criminalizing the consumption of drugs in the body does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by subject-
ing "status criminals" to prosecution. 
Citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417 (1962), the court of 
appeals also concluded that if "consumption" includes the metabolization of a 
substance in the body, it "would subject 'status criminals/ such as drug addicts, to 
continuous guilt for possession or use of a controlled substance " Ireland, 2005 
UT App 22, Tf 20. Robinson does not support this proposition. 
Robinson struck down a California law which made it a criminal offense for a 
person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660,82 S.Ct. at 
1417. Robinson observed that the gist of the California statute was "proof of 
addiction by circumstantial evidence . . . by the tell-tale track of needle marks and 
scabs over the veins of [a defendant's] arms." Id. at 666,82 S.Ct. at 1420 (citation and 
quotes omitted). The High Court concluded that the statute violated the Eighth 
Amendment because it was "not [a statute] which punishes a person for the use of 
narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly 
behavior resulting from their administration." Id. (emphasis added). 
Robinson thus stands for the proposition that "criminal penalties may be inflicted 
only if the accused has committed [or is committing] some act, has engaged [or is 
engaging] in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing " 
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,533,88 S.Ct. 2145,2154-55 (1968). Penalizing a person 
who is in the process of consuming or otherwise using a controlled substance does 
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not subject an addict to continuous guilt, as held by the court of appeals. The addict 
is only guilty while using—during that time the drug is being consumed and 
affecting his or her body, e.g., where methamphetamine is present in the blood-
stream and producing its intended and/or adverse effects. 
While many addicts will undoubtedly be convicted for using drugs, they are 
subect to prosecution only for their use of the drug. Even the addict stops use for 
periods of time. And "drugs, like alcohol, are evanescent in a person's blood 
system/' State v. Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127,129 (Ari. App. 1998) (reciting testimony of 
expert). For example, methamphetamine —the controlled substance found in 
defendant's blood—has a mean elimination half life of between 10.1 and 12.2 hours, 
depending on the manner in which the drug was taken. Drugs and Human Perform-
ance Fact Sheets - Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine), U.S. Dep't of Transportation: 
Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) at 62 (April 2004), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ injury/ research/jobl85drugs/methampheta-
mine.htm (Addendum B). And while the overall effects of the drug "typically last 4-
8 hours" and the residual effects "can last up to 12 hours," the effects of crashing 
from binge use, which include "intense fatigue, uncontrollable sleepiness and 
. . . continuing stimulation," can last between 1-3 days. In other words, the use 
methamphetamine by the user continues long after the drug has been swallowed, 
inhaled, or injected. 
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In this case, defendant was actively using and under the influence of metham-
phetamine, as evidenced by the presence of methamphetamine in his blood and his 
behavior. And whether he introduced the substance into his body in Utah or 
elsewhere, the State of Utah has a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing 
persons from using the drug, e.g., being under the influence of the drug in Utah. See 
State v. Brown, 440 P.2d 909, 910-11 (Ariz. 1968) (holding that a law prohibiting 
persons from being under the influence of a drug do not violate Robinson). 
The court of appeals complained that because hair follicle analysis can detect 
drug use long after it has been introduced into the body, a broader definition of 
consumption "could subject individuals to prosecution who used drugs months or 
even years prior " Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, *J 20 (citing Major Samuel J. Rob, 
Drug Detection by Hair Analysis, 1991 Army Lawyer 10, 10-14). This claim is not 
supported by the authority upon which the court of appeals relied: 
As blood circulates through the body, it nourishes the hair follicle. If 
drug metabolites are present in the blood, trace amounts of the drug 
become entrapped in the core of the hair in amounts roughly propor-
tional to those ingested. Those traces remain in the hair as it grows out 
of the head at a rate of approximately one-half inch per month The 
drug metabolites do not diminish with time and will exist until the ac-
tual hair is destroyed. 
Rob, at 10-11. In other words, the metabolite incorporated into the hair only 
confirms prior use, not present use. In contrast, the presence of a controlled sub-
stance in the blood confirms present and ongoing use. 
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* * * 
In sum, the consumption of a controlled substance in the body is the ultimate use 
of that drug. The narrow definition of the court of appeals absolves a user from 
responsibility as soon as he has introduced the drug into his system. Yet, the real 
"use" is not in possessing the drug or introducing it into the body, but in the effects 
of the drug as the body consumes it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted July 21,2005. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
y S. Gray y ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
ill Defendant Jeffrey Don Ireland appeals his conviction of 
unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (2002) -1 
Defendant alleges that the trial court misinterpreted the meaning 
of "consumption" under Utah Code section 58-37-2(1)(dd). Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (dd) (2002). We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
\2 On November 3, 20 01, while driving a car in Salt Lake 
County, Defendant hit another vehicle, resulting in the death of 
its driver. While at a hospital following the accident, West 
1. Although the legislature has amended this statute since 
Defendant was charged, the amendments do not affect the outcome 
of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (2002) . 
Therefore, for ease of reference, we cite to the most recent 
version of this statute. 
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Valley Police Officer Buchanan observed Defendant exhibiting what 
he regarded as symptoms of a person under the influence of a 
narcotic: constricted pupils, dry mouth, muscle tremors, 
deliberate, short sentences, and an unsteady gait. On this 
basis, Officer Buchanan obtained5 a search warrant to test 
Defendant's blood and urine for controlled substances. 
Notwithstanding the absence of any narcotic in Defendant's urine 
samples, Defendant's blood tested positive for marijuana and 0.1 
mcg/ml of methamphetamine. 
113 While the presence of controlled substances was detected in 
Defendant's blood, he did not have any paraphernalia or drugs 
packaged for use with him. Despite this, the State charged 
Defendant with unlawful possession or use of a controlled 
substance for the methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and 
driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body for 
the marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. 
^4 In a pretrial ruling, the court determined that it had 
jurisdiction over the possession^ or use of a controlled substance 
charge. The trial court concluded that "'consumption1 continued 
so long as the methamphetamine was being metabolized in 
[D]efendant's body." Furthermore, the trial court reasoned that, 
because Defendant was metabolizing the methamphetamine before, 
during, and after the accident, his unlawful possession or use of 
a controlled substance was committed at least partly within this 
state, and thus established jurisdiction. Defendant then pleaded 
guilty to both charges, but reserved the right to appeal the 
trial court's jurisdiction regarding the felony charge. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1f5 Defendant presents two arguments in support of his 
contention that the trial court misinterpreted the possession or 
use statute. First, he asserts that the plain meaning of 
"consumption," as used in section 58-37-2 (1) (dd) does not include 
a substance being metabolized in the body. Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-2 (1) (dd) . Second, he argues that the trial court violated his 
right to due process by improperly shifting the burden to him to 
show that the substance found in his blood was not consumed in 
Utah. 
^6 Both of Defendant's arguments hinge on his assertion that 
the trial court misinterpreted the statutory meaning of 
"consumption." As such, "[t]he proper interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law which we review for correctness, 
according no deference to the [judge's] legal conclusion." State 
v. Redd, 1999 UT 108,1(10, 992 P.2d 986. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Plain Meaning of "Consumption" Under Section 58-37-2(1) (dd) 
U7 Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that 
it had jurisdiction over the felony charge, determining that 
"consumption," as included in the definition of possession or use 
of a controlled substance under section 58-37-2(1)(dd), is an 
ongoing process in which the body physiologically metabolizes the 
substance. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(dd). This issue presents 
a question of first impression in Utah. 
%& "When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the 
statute's plain language to determine the Legislature's intent 
and purpose. We read the plain language of the statute as a 
whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. 
Weaver, 2003 UT 12,fl7, 66 P.3d 592. When interpreting a 
statute, this court seeks to "avoid interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." State 
v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^ [52, 63 P. 3d 621 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
19 Utah Code section 58-37-8(2') (a) (i) makes it unlawful "for 
any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-37-8(2)(a)(i). The 
relevant part of section 58-37-2(1)(dd) defines "possession or 
use" under chapter 37 as "the application, inhalation, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . of controlled 
substances." Id. § 58-37-2 (1) (dd) (emphasis added). 
110 We first look to the ordinary meaning of "consumption." 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "consumption" as "[t]he act of 
destroying a thing by using it; the use of a thing in a way that 
thereby exhausts it." Black's Law Dictionary 312 (7th ed. 1999) . 
Webster's defines "consumption" as "the act or process of 
consuming[.]" Webster's Ninth New College Dictionary 282 (1986) . 
Further, Webster's defines "consume" as "to do away with 
completely[,] . . . to spend wastefully[,] . . . to eat or drink 
esp. in great quantity [,] . ... to waste or burn away[.]" Id. 
f^ll Defendant argues for a narrow interpretation of 
"consumption." He suggests that, when looking at the surrounding 
nouns of the statute, "consumption" is a present tense nominal 
describing the introduction of a substance into the body, and not 
an ongoing metabolic process. We agree. 
[^12 Had the Utah Legislature wanted to make the metabolization 
of controlled substances a crime in section 58-37-2(1)(dd), it 
could have done so by explicitly including it as it has done in 
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other statutes related to controlled substances. Indeed, the 
Utah Code currently contains nine sections that use the term 
"metabolite" in connection with controlled substances.2 gee Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44.10 (1) (a)/ -44.12 (2) (c)# -44.6(2) (Supp. 
2004) (dealing with motor vehicles); see also id. §§ 53-3-
220 (1) (a) (xiii), -223 (1) (a) (2002) (concerning public safety); 
id^ §§ 34-41-101(2), -102(2), 34A-2-302(4)(a)(i) (2001) (relating 
to labor) . 
1|l3 Statutes from other states support a narrow' definition of 
the term "consumption." Michigan's impaired driving statute 
defines "consumed" as "to have eaten, drunk, ingested, inhaled, 
injected, or topically applied, or to have performed any 
combination of those actions, or otherwise introduced into the 
body." Mich. Comp. Laws. § 768.37(3) (b) (2004). Oregon defines 
"ingest" as "to consume or otherwise deliver a controlled 
substance into the body of a person." Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 475.984(3)(c) (2003). And Texas defines "human consumption" as 
"the injection, inhalation, ingestion, or application of a 
substance to or into the body."
 fcTex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 481.002(21) (2004). The State* on the other hand, cites no 
statutes in support of their position that "consumption" is 
defined as including metabolization. Thus, we are unpersuaded 
that our legislature intended' "consumption" under section 58-37-
2(1) (dd) to include metabolization of controlled substances. 
^14 In addition, caselaw from this state and others supports 
this interpretation. In State v. Sorenson, a minor was arrested 
for unlawfully possessing alcohol when an officer smelled the 
substance on his breath during a traffic stop. See 758 P.2d 4 66, 
467 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . Notwithstanding the absence of alcohol 
on his person or a failed sobriety test, Sorenson was convicted 
of illegally possessing alcohol. See id. This court agreed with 
the trial courtfs finding "that the mere presence of alcohol on 
the breath or in the bloodstream.does not constitute possession 
under the statute." Id. at 468.l Further, this court remarked in 
a footnote that such a "position is consistent with well-reasoned 
decisions from other jurisdictions which have addressed the 
issue." Id. at 468 n.2 (citing State v. Lewis, 394 N.W.2d 212, 
217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Sta'te v. Hornadav, 713 P.2d 71, 76 
(Wash. 1986), superseded bv statute on other grounds). 
[^15 Other state appellate courts have addressed this issue as 
well. In State v. Flinchpauorh, the defendant was involved in a 
car accident that resulted in the death of the other car's 
driver. See 659 P.2d 208, 209-10 (Kan. 1983). A blood test 
2. A "metabolite" is "a product of metabolism[.]" Webster!s 
Ninth New College Dictionary 745 (1986). 
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revealed the presence of controlled substances. See id. at 210. 
Without presenting evidence as to how the substances were 
"introduced into the defendant's system," the State charged 
Flinchpaugh with possession of a controlled substance. Id. 
Affirming the lower court's dismissal of the charge, the Kansas 
Supreme Court concluded that.!'[o] nee a controlled substance is 
within a person's system, the power of the person to control, 
possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end. The drug 
is assimilated by the body. The ability to control the drug is 
beyond human capabilities." Id. at 211. 
Hl6 The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in 
State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986). In Hornaday, a 
minor was charged with illegal consumption or possession of 
alcohol. See id. at 73. The court analogized the alcohol in 
that case with narcotics, noting that " [o]nee a narcotic is 
injected into the vein, or swallowed orally, it is no longer in 
the individual's control for the purposes of possession." Id. at 
75. Furthermore, the court concluded that "the terms 'consume1 
and 'possession' . . . do not include the stage at which the 
liquor has already been swallowed but is still being assimilated 
by the body." Id. at 76; see also State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 
N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that to 
"'consume,' in the context of alcoholic beverages, means to 
drink, and that once drunk, alcohol is no longer being 
consumed."). 
%17 Hornaday has been cited as a case that exposes the 
"absurdity of defining the word 'consume' so as to encompass the 
metabolization of alcohol in the body." State v. Preston, 832 
P.2d 513, 516 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). In justifying the result, 
the Hornaday court examined the impact of a contrary ruling. The 
court suggested that the broader interpretation of "consume" or 
"possess" would subject minors to prosecution if they ventured 
across state lines to drink legally in a neighboring state if, 
upon their return, there was any'trace of alcohol still in their 
system. See Hornaday, 713 P.2d at 77. 
Kl8 While the State did not counter with cases supporting its 
broad conception of "consumption," it attempted to distinguish 
this line of cases, suggesting that they apply to consumption of 
alcohol and not drugs. Thus, the State advocated two definitions 
of "consumption": one for alcohol and one for drugs. We, 
however, do not think that the' legislature intended two different 
meanings of "consumption" in the Utah Code. Furthermore, 
multiple definitions would be potentially confusing to the 
public's perception of what behavior is prohibited. 
tl9 The State next argues that the narrow definition of 
"consumption" renders the other listed nouns--"application, 
o n n m r\cn mi 
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inhalation, swallowing, injection"--superfluous. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2(1) (dd) . However, it is more likely that "consumption" 
was included in section 58-37-2(1)(dd) as a catchall term to 
encompass novel methods of introducing a substance into the body. 
Indeed, drug users have proven' most creative in discovering new 
ways to administer substances., Accordingly, we hold that 
"consumption" under section 58-37-2(1)(dd) is a method of 
introducing a substance into the body. 
1f2 0 Furthermore, a contrary holding would subject "status 
criminals," such as drug addicts, to continuous guilt for 
possession or use of a controlled substance, "whether or not 
[they had] ever used or possessed any narcotics within the 
State." Robinson v. California,' 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) 
(holding that imprisonment of drug addict in a state where he 
never used any narcotic drugs would be cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of Fourteenth Amendment). Additionally, 
with improved drug testing, such^  as hair follicle analysis, the 
State!s broad definition of "consumption" could subject 
individuals to prosecution who used drugs months or even years 
prior because of the substance!s continued presence in their 
bodies. See Major Samuel J. ,Rob, Drug Detection by Hair 
Analysis, 1991 Army Law. 10, '10-14 (describing the process of 
drug testing via hair follicle analysis). Hence, the trial court 
erred by adopting a broad definition of "consumption" to include 
metabolization. 
II. Due Process 
K21 Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court violated the 
due process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution, as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, by improperly shifting to him the 
burden to show that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
possession or use charge. Defendant asserts that the trial court 
erred by finding that "[i]n order to establish jurisdiction, the 
State need not prove where the defendant ingested the 
methamphetamine." 
1[22 To prosecute a person in Utah, the State must establish 
jurisdiction by showing that the offense was "committed either 
wholly or partly within the state," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
201(1) (a) (2003), by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. 
§ 76-1-501(3) (2003). At trial, the court relied on the broad 
definition of "consumption" that allowed the mere metabolization 
of a controlled substance while in the state to satisfy the 
jurisdictional requirements. We have rejected that view. 
Because the trial court used the broad definition, it improperly 
asserted jurisdiction over the possession or use of a controlled 
substance charge. As a result, we need not determine if the 
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trial court erred by requiring Defendant to refute the State's 
assertion of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
^23 Consistent with statutes and cases from this and other 
jurisdictions, "consumption" under section 58-37-2 (1) (dd) is a 
method of introducing a substance into the body. Id, § 58-3 7-
2(1)(dd). The trial court erred in concluding that 
metabolization of a controlled substance earlier introduced 
constituted "consumption." Furthermore, because the State 
offered no evidence of where Defendant consumed the drugs, the 
trial court lacked evidence to establish that the crime of 
possession or use of a controlled substance took place in whole 
or in part in Utah. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
asserting jurisdiction. 
K24 Accordingly, we reverse Defendant's conviction on the felony 
unlawful possession charge. 
THORNE, judge (concurring): 
[^26 I wholeheartedly agree with the majority opinion, and write 
only to highlight my principal difficulty with the State's 
position. Under the State's view, the penalties associated with 
the dangers posed by drug use are stood on their head. A 
pedestrian arrested with a controlled substance in their blood-
regardless of their activities at the time of the arrest--would 
be subject to a greater penalty than someone arrested for driving 
with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in their 
blood. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (2003); 41-6-
44(2)(a)(ii) (1998). The State argues that the legislature 
intended this result and that the legislature has the right and 
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the authority to make this distinction. I agree that the 
legislature has both the rigjit and the authority. But, in the 
absence of an express legislative statement supporting the 
State's position, we should avoid drawing problematic 
conclusions. See Rowley v. Public Serv. CommTn, 112 Utah 116, 
185 P.2d 514, 519 (1947) (stating n,a purpose to disregard sound 
public policy must not be attributed to the lawmaking power, 
except upon the most cogent evidence, and it is the duty of the 
courts to render such an interpretation of the laws as will best 
promote the protection of the public1" (citation omitted));1 
Department of Human Servs. v. B.R., 2002 UT App 25,^9, 42 P.3d 
390 (accepting parenthetically that "following the literal 
statutory wording is not required when to do so would defeat 
legislative intent and make the statute absurd" (quotations and 
citation omitted)) * 
^27 Here, adopting the State's position would lead to the absurd 
result that the unlawful possession or use of a controlled 
substance, a felony, would become a lesser-included offense of 
driving with any measurable amount of a controlled substance in 
the blood, a misdemeanor. Moreover, in those cases not involving 
a vehicle, the State's position amounts to imposing a greater 
penalty upon a sleeping, standing, or walking defendant who is in 
possession through presence iii the blood, than upon a driver who 
is actively endangering others by operating a potentially deadly 
vehicle with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in the 
blood. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs creates a 
grave public safety concern, andr the mayhem that results from it 
is one that the legislature clearly intends to punish harshly. 
1. In further support of this principle, the Rowley court also 
stated: 
We have not overlooked the legal principle 
that if the intent of the legislature is by 
the statute made clear and certain, even 
though we may believe the legislation absurd 
and undesirable, we cannot substitute the 
judgment of the court for the judgment of the 
legislature. On the other hand, when the 
legislative intent is not clear and certain, 
and a literal interpretation of the language 
of the statute gives ah absurd result, then 
the court is justified' in searching the 
enactment for further indications of 
legislative intent. 
Rowlev v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514, 519-20 
(1947). Here, the majority has ably divined the legislative 
intent underlying the statute, and in doing so has avoided an 
otherwise absurd result. 
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It makes little sense to treat an offender who has prohibited 
drugs in his bloodstream less seriously if he moves behind the 
wheel of a vehicle, than if he merely chooses to walk to his 
destination. Adopting the State's position would create just 
such a result. 
f^28 Accordingly, I concur. 
William' A. Thorne Jr., T^udge 
20021053-CA Q 
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Introduction 
The use of psychoactive drugs followed by driving has been an issue of continual concern 
to law enforcement officers, physicians, attorneys, forensic toxicologists and traffic 
safety professionals in the U.S. and throughout the world. At issue are methods for 
identifying the impaired driver on the road, the assessment and documentation of the 
impairment they display, the availability of appropriate chemical tests, and the 
interpretation of the subsequent results. A panel of international experts on drug-related 
driving issues met to review developments in the field of drugs and human performance 
over the last 10 years; to identify the specific effects that both illicit and prescription 
drugs have on driving; and to develop guidance for others when dealing with drug-
impaired driving problems. 
This publication is based on the deliberations of the International Consultative Panel on 
Drugs and Driving Impairment held in Seattle, WA in August 2000. This meeting was 
sponsored by the National Safety Council, Committee on Alcohol and other Drugs; the 
State of Washington Traffic Safety Commission; and the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration. Delegates represented the fields of psychopharmacology, 
behavioral psychology, drug chemistry, forensic toxicology, medicine, and law 
enforcement experts trained in the recognition of drug effects on drivers in the field. The 
Fact Sheets reflect the conclusions of the Panel and have been designed to provide 
practical guidance to toxicologists, pharmacologists, law enforcement officers, attorneys 
and the general public on issues related to drug impaired driving. 
Sixteen drugs were selected for review and include over-the-counter medications, 
prescription drugs, and illicit and/or abused drugs. The selected drugs are 
cannabis/marijuana, carisoprodol, cocaine, dextromethorphan, diazepam, 
diphenhydramine, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, ketamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, 
methadone, methamphetamine/amphetamine, methylenedioxymethamphetmaine, 
morphine/heroin, phencyclidine, toluene, and Zolpidem. 
The Fact Sheets are based on the state of current scientific knowledge and represent the 
conclusions of the panel. They have been designed to provide practical guidance to 
toxicologists, pharmacologists, law enforcement officers, attorneys and the general public 
to use in the evaluation of future cases. Each individual drug Fact Sheet covers 
information regarding drug chemistry, usage and dosage information, pharmacology, 
drug effects, effects on driving, drug evaluation and classification (DEC), and the panel's 
assessment of driving risks. A list of key references and recommended reading is also 
provided for each drug. Readers are encouraged to use the Fact Sheets in connection with 
the other cited impaired driving-related texts. 
The information provided is uniform for all the Fact Sheets and provides details on the 
physical description of the drug, synonyms, and pharmaceutical or illicit sources; medical 
and recreational uses, recommended and abused doses, typical routes of administration, 
and potency and purity; mechanism of drug action and major receptor sites; drug 
absorption, distribution, metabolism and elimination data; blood and urine 
concentrations; psychological and physiological effects, and drug interactions; drug 
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effects on psychomotor performance effects; driving simulator and epidemiology studies; 
and drug recognition evaluation profiles. Each Fact Sheet concludes with general 
statements about the drugs' ability to impair driving performance. The authors strongly 
believe that all the above information needs to be taken into account when evaluating a 
drug. 
Case interpretation can be complicated by a number of factors and one of the main 
limitations of the Fact Sheets is that they primarily relate to single drug use. Other factors 
which influence the risk of effects on driving for any drug include the dose, the dosage 
frequency, acute and residual effects, chronic administration, route of administration, the 
concentration of the drug at the site of action, idiosyncrasies of metabolism, drug 
tolerance or hypersensitivity, and the combined effects of the drug with other drugs or 
alcohol, to name but a few. 
Individual Fact Sheets 
Cannabis/Marijuana 
Carisoprodol (and Meprobamate) 
Cocaine 
Dextromethorphan 
Diazepam 
Diphenhydramine 
Gamma-Hydroxybutyrate (GHB, GBL, and 1,4-BD) 
Ketamine 
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) 
Methadone 
Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine) 
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, Ecstasy) 
Morphine (and Heroin) 
Phencyclidine (PCP) 
Toluene 
Zolpidem (and Zaleplon, Zopiclone) 
Lead Authors: 
Fiona Couper, Ph.D. and Barry Logan, Ph.D. 
Main contributors: 
Michael J Corbett, Ph.D., Laurel Farrell, BS, Marilyn Huestis Ph.D., Wayne Jeffrey, BS, 
Jan Raemakers Ph.D. 
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Other delegates to the consensus conference: 
Marcelline Burns, Ph.D.; Yale Caplan, Ph.D.; Dennis Crouch, BS, MBA; Johann De 
Gier, Ph.D.; Olaf Drummer Ph.D.; Kurt Dubowski, Ph.D.; Robert Forney Jr., Ph.D.; 
Bernd Freidel, M.D.; Manfred Moeller, Ph.D.; Thomas Page, BA; Lionel Raymon, 
Pharm.D., Ph.D., Wim Riedel, Ph.D.; Laurent Rivier, Ph.D.; Annemiek Vermeeren, 
Ph.D. and H. Chip Walls BS. Other participants included James F. Frank, Ph.D. from the 
NHTSA Office of Research & Technology; Sgt. Steven Johnson of the Washington State 
Patrol; Capt. Chuck Hayes of the Oregon State Patrol; and Sgt. Douglas Paquette of the 
New York State Police. 
Disclaimer 
The information contained in the Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets represents 
the views of the contributors and not necessarily those of their place of employment or 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 
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Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine) 
Methamphetamine hydrochloride is a white to light brown crystalline powder, or clear 
chunky crystals resembling ice. Methamphetamine base is a liquid. 
Synonyms: Methamphetamine: chalk, chrissy, crank, crystal, glass, go, hydro, ice, meth, 
rock candy, speed, whiz; Desoxyn®\ Amphetamine: dextroamphetamine; Dexedrine®, 
Adderall®, Benzedrine®, DextroStat®, Biphetamine®, Gradumet®. 
Source: The majority of street methamphetamine is produced in clandestine laboratories 
(e.g. reduction of /-ephedrine or d-pseudoephedrine over red phosphorus with hydroiodic 
acid, or reduction with sodium or lithium in condensed liquid ammonia). 
Methamphetamine remains concentrated in western U. S. states and some rural areas 
elsewhere. d-Methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled substance (Desoxyn®) 
available in 5 mg white, 10 mg pink, and 15 mg yellow strength tablets. Amphetamine is 
also a Schedule II controlled substance and is usually supplied as the sulfate salt of the d-
isomer (Dexedrine®), or as the racemic mixture (Benzedrine®), or a mixture of the two 
(Adderall®). Dexedrine® is available in 5, 10, and 15 mg strength, orange/black 
capsules, or 5 mg tablets. Adderall® is available in 5, 7.5,10,12.5, 20, and 30 mg 
strength, blue or orange tablets. 
Drug Class: CNS stimulant, sympathomimetic, appetite suppressant. 
Medical and Recreational Uses: Medicinally, methamphetamine is used in the 
treatment of narcolepsy, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Typical doses are 10 mg/day or up to 40 mg daily, and a 
course of greater than six weeks is not recommended. Methamphetamine is infrequently 
used in the treatment of obesity, overeating disorders, and weight loss due to its abuse 
potential. Amphetamine is also used in ADD, narcolepsy, and weight control. 
Recreationally, methamphetamine is abused to increase alertness, relieve fatigue, control 
weight, treat mild depression, and for its intense euphoric effects. 
Potency, Purity and Dose: Purity of methamphetamine is currently very high, at 60-
90%, and is predominantly d-methamphetamine which has greater CNS potency than the 
/-isomer or the racemic mixture. Common abused doses are 100-1000 mg/day, and up to 
5000 mg/day in chronic binge use. Therapeutic doses of Desoxyn® are 2.5-10 mg daily, 
with dosing not exceed 60 mg/day. To treat narcolepsy, 5-60 mg/day of amphetamine is 
ingested in divided doses; and in ADD and ADHD doses of 2.5-10 mg/day is 
administered, depending on age. 
Route of Administration: Methamphetamine users often begin with intranasal or oral 
use and progress to intravenous use, and occasionally smoking. In contrast to cocaine, the 
hydrochloride salt of methamphetamine can itself be smoked. Methamphetamine is used 
sometimes with alcohol or marijuana, particularly during the withdrawal phase. 
Pharmacodynamics: Methamphetamine increases synaptic levels of the 
neurotransmitters dopamine, serotonin (5-HT) and norepinephrine, and has a and (3 
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adrenergic agonist effects. Norepinephrine is responsible for methamphetamine's 
alerting, anorectic, locomotor and sympathomimetic effects; dopamine stimulates 
locomotor effects, psychosis, and perception disturbances; and 5HT is responsible for 
delusions and psychosis. Methamphetamine's effects are similar to cocaine but its onset 
is slower and the duration is longer. Racemic amphetamine and d-amphetamine have 
similar chemical properties and actions to methamphetamine but are less potent. 
Pharmacokinetics: Following oral administration, peak methamphetamine 
concentrations are seen in 2.6-3.6 hours and the mean elimination half-life is 10.1 hours 
(range 6.4-15 hours). The amphetamine metabolite peaks at 12 hours. Following 
intravenous injection, the mean elimination half-life is slightly longer (12.2 hours). 
Methamphetamine is metabolized to amphetamine (active), p-OH-amphetamine and 
norephedrine (both inactive). Several other drugs are metabolized to amphetamine and 
methamphetamine and include benzphetamine, selegeline, and famprofazone. 
Molecular Interactions /Receptor Chemistry: Methamphetamine is metabolized to 
amphetamine via cytochrome P450 2D6. Potential inhibitors of the 2D6 isoenzyme could 
decrease the rate of methamphetamine elimination if administered concurrently, while 
potential inducers could increase the rate of elimination. 
Blood to Plasma Concentration Ratio: 0.65 (N=l). 
Interpretation of Blood Concentrations: Blood concentrations can generally be used to 
distinguish therapeutic use from abuse. Concentrations of 0.02-0.05 mg/L are typical for 
therapeutic use, and up to 0.2 mg/L have been documented. Concentrations greater than 
this represent abuse. Concentrations do not disclose phase of use. Normal concentrations 
in recreational use are 0.01 to 2.5 mg/L (median 0.6 mg/L). Concentrations above this 
range will likely be associated with severe, possibly life threatening, toxicity. There is no 
evidence for improved performance in any task or test following use of doses greater than 
40 mg (or concentrations greater than 0.2 mg/L). 
Peak blood methamphetamine concentrations occur shortly after injection, a few 
minutes after smoking, and around 3 hours after oral dosing. Peak plasma amphetamine 
concentrations occur around 10 hours after methamphetamine use. 
Interpretation of Urine Test Results: Positive results generally indicate use within 1-4 
days but could be up to a week following heavy chronic use. Rate of excretion into the 
urine is heavily influenced by urinary pH. Between 30-54% of an oral dose is excreted in 
urine as unchanged methamphetamine and 10-23% as unchanged amphetamine. 
Following an intravenous dose, 45% is excreted as unchanged parent drug and 7% 
amphetamine. 
Effects: Methamphetamine effects are less intense after oral ingestion than following 
smoked or intravenous use. 
Early phase - Psychological: Euphoria, excitation, exhilaration, rapid flight of ideas, 
increased libido, rapid speech, motor restlessness, hallucinations, delusions, psychosis, 
insomnia, reduced fatigue or drowsiness, increased alertness, heightened sense of well 
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being, stereotypes behavior, feelings of increased physical strength, and poor impulse 
control. 
Early phase - Physiological: Increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, increased 
respiration rate, elevated temperature, palpitations, irregular heartbeat, dry mouth, 
abdominal cramps, appetite suppressed, twitching, pallor, dilated pupils, HGN at high 
doses, faster reaction time, increased strength, and more efficient glucose utilization. 
Late phase - Psychological: Dysphoria, residual stimulation, restlessness, agitation, 
nervousness, paranoia, violence, aggression, lack of coordination, pseudo-hallucinations, 
delusions, psychosis, and drug craving. 
Late phase - Physiological: Fatigue, sleepiness with sudden starts, 
itching/picking/scratching, normal heart rate, and normal to small pupils which are 
reactive to light. 
Binge use of methamphetamine can be broken down into the following phases: 
Rush - (5 minutes) intense euphoria, rapid flight of ideas, sexual stimulation, high 
energy, obsessive/compulsive activity, thought blending, dilated pupils; Shoulder -
(1 hour) less intense euphoria, hyperactivity, rapid flight of ideas, obsessive/compulsive 
activity, thought blending, dilated pupils; Binge use - (1-5 days) the drug is frequently 
readministered in an attempt to regain or maintain euphoria; Tweaking - (4-24 hours) 
dysphoria, scattered and disorganized thought, intense craving, paranoia, anxiety and 
irritability, hypervigilance, auditory and tactile hallucinations, delusions, and normal 
pupils; Crash-(1-3 days) intense fatigue, uncontrollable sleepiness and catnapping, 
continuing stimulation, drug craving; Normal - (2-7 days) apparent return to "normalcy" 
although drug craving may appear; Withdrawal - anergia, anhedonia, waves of intense 
craving, depression, hypersomnolence, exhaustion, extreme fatigue. 
Side Effect Profile: Light sensitivity, irritability, insomnia, nervousness, headache, 
tremors, anxiety, suspiciousness, paranoia, aggressiveness, delusions, hallucinations, 
irrational behavior, and violence. In overdose, symptoms may include hyperthermia, 
tachycardia, severe hypertension, convulsions, chest pains, stroke, cardiovascular 
collapse, and possible death. Other common side effects following abuse of 
amphetamines include viral hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs), HIV, 
septicemia, abscesses, collapsed blood vessels, and malnutrition. Chronic abuse generally 
produces a psychosis that resembles schizophrenia and is characterized by paranoia, 
picking at the skin, preoccupation with one's own thoughts, and auditory and visual 
hallucinations. Violent and erratic behavior is frequently seen among chronic abusers. 
Over time, methamphetamine appears to cause reduced levels of dopamine, which can 
result in symptoms like those of Parkinson's disease. 
Duration of Effects: Onset of effects is rapid following intravenous use and smoking, 
while effects onset more slowly following oral use. Overall effects typically last 4-8 
hours; residual effects can last up to 12 hours. 
Tolerance, Dependence and Withdrawal Effect: Methamphetamine has a high potential 
for abuse and dependence. Tolerance may develop and users may quickly become 
addicted and use it with increasing frequency and in increasing doses. Abrupt 
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discontinuation of use can produce extreme fatigue, mental depression, apathy, long 
periods of sleep, irritability, and disorientation. 
Drug Interactions: Phenobarbital, propoxyphene, phenytoin and MAOFs slow the 
metabolism of amphetamines and increases their effect on the release of norepinephrine 
and other monoamines from adrenergic nerve endings. Amphetamines may counteract 
sedative effects of antihistamines. Methamphetamine may restore ethanol induced 
impairment in simple repetitive tasks of short duration, however, there is no restoration of 
ethanol-induced deficits of balance and steadiness. In general, high doses of 
amphetamines are likely to increase the impairing effects of alcohol. Chlorpromazine and 
haloperidol block dopamine and norepinephrine reuptake, thus inhibiting the central 
stimulant effects of amphetamines. Amphetamine potentiates the analgesic effect of 
meperidine. 
Performance Effects: Laboratory studies have been limited to much lower doses than 
those used by methamphetamine abusers. Doses of 10-30 mg methamphetamine have 
shown to improve reaction time, relief fatigue, improve cognitive function testing, 
increase subjective feelings of alertness, increase time estimation, and increase euphoria. 
However, subjects were willing to make more high-risk choices. The majority of 
laboratory tests were administered 1 hour post dose. Expected performance effects 
following higher doses may include agitation, inability to focus attention on divided 
attention tasks, inattention, restlessness, motor excitation, increased reaction time, and 
time distortion, depressed reflexes, poor balance and coordination, and inability to follow 
directions. 
Effects on Driving: The drug manufacturer states that patients should be informed that 
methamphetamine and amphetamine may impair the ability to engage in potentially 
hazardous activities such as driving a motor vehicle. In epidemiology studies drive-off-
the-road type accidents, high speed, failing to stop, diminished divided attention, 
inattentive driving, impatience, and high risk driving have been reported. Significant 
impairment of driving performance would also be expected during drug withdrawal. In a 
recent review of 101 driving under the influence cases, where methamphetamine was the 
only drug detected, blood concentrations ranged from <0.05-2.36 mg/L (mean 0.35 mg/L, 
median 0.23 mg/L). Driving and driver behaviors included speeding, lane travel, erratic 
driving, accidents, nervousness, rapid and non-stop speech, unintelligible speech, 
disorientation, agitation, staggering and awkward movements, irrational or violent 
behavior, and unconsciousness. Impairment was attributed to distraction, disorientation, 
motor excitation, hyperactive reflexes, general cognitive impairment, or withdrawal, 
fatigue and hypersomnolence. 
DEC Category: CNS stimulant. 
DEC Profile: Horizontal gaze nystagmus not present; vertical gaze nystagmus not 
present; lack of convergence not present; pupil size dilated; reaction to light slow; pulse 
rate elevated; blood pressure elevated; body temperature normal to down. Other 
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characteristic indicators may include restlessness, body tremors, talkativeness, 
exaggerated reflexes, anxiety, and track marks or recent injection sites. 
Panel's Assessment of Driving Risks: At lower dose, amphetamines have few effects on 
cognitive functioning and may result in an enhancement of some psychomotor tasks, but 
risk-taking increases at higher doses and responses become inappropriate. Drug 
withdrawal could also lead to the impairment of psychomotor skills required for safe 
driving. 
References and Recommended Reading: 
Baselt RC. Drug effects on psychomotor performance. Biomedical Publications, Foster 
City, CA; pp 30-5, pp 244-6;2001. 
Forney R. Stimulants, drugs & driving, NIDA research monograph 11, ed by Willette, RE 
1977:73-6. 
Gygi MP, Gygi SP, Johnson M, Wilkins DG, Gibb JW, Hanson GR. Mechanisms for 
tolerance to methamphetamine effects. Neuropharmacol 1996;35(6):751-7. 
Hurst PM. Amphetamines and driving. Ale Drugs Driv 1987;3(l):13-6. 
Jerome L, Segal A. Benefit of long-term stimulus on driving in adults with ADHD. J 
NervMentDis 2001(l);189:63-4. 
Logan BK. Amphetamines: an update on forensic issues. J Anal Toxicol 2001;25(5):400-
4. 
Logan BK. Methamphetamine and driving impairment. J Forensic Sci 1996;41(3):457-
64. 
Logan BK. Methamphetamine - Effects on Human Performance and Behavior. Forens 
Sci Rev 2002;14(1/2):133-51. 
National Transportation Safety Board safety study: Fatigue, alcohol, other drugs, and 
medical factors in fatal-to-the-driver heavy truck crashes (vol I and II). Accession* 
PB90-917002, report* NTSB/SS-90/01/02, National Transportation Safety Board, 
Washington DC, 1990. 
Perez-Reyes M, White WR, McDonald SA, Hicks RE, Jeffcoat AR, Hill JM, Cook CE. 
Clinical effects of daily methamphetamine administration. Clin Neuropharm 
1991(4);14:352-8. 
Physicians' Desk Reference, Medical Economics Company, Montvale, NJ, 2002. 
Smith DE, Fischer CM. An nalysis of 310 cases of acute high dose methamphetamine 
toxicity in Haight-Ashbury. Clin Toxicol 1970;3(1): 117-24. 
-65 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
